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Abstract
This paper analyzes the joint design of fiscal and cap-and-trade instruments in
climate policies under uncertainty. Whether the optimal mechanism is a mixed
policy (with some firms subject to a tax and others to a cap-and-trade) or a uni-
form one (with all firms subject to the same instrument) depends on parameters
reflecting preferences, production, and, most importantly, the stochastic structure
of the shocks affecting the economy. This framework is then used to address the
issue of the non-cooperative design of climate regulation systems in various areas
worldwide under uncertainty. We characterize the resulting inefficiency, we show
how the Pareto argument in favor of merging ETS of different regions is reinforced
under uncertainty, and we discuss the non-cooperative design of mixed systems.
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1 Introduction
United Nations have given up on trying to implement a unique carbon price, though
economists promote it.1 The standard economic argument is efficiency, which requires all
actors to face an identical marginal cost of pollution. A unique price in a given period can
be achieved by imposing a tax worldwide or designing a global Emission Trading System
(ETS), also called a cap-and trade system. But economists still discuss the relative merits
of fiscal instruments compared to cap-and-trade mechanisms.2 In practice, the cap-and-
trade approach seems more successful recently as various forms of ETS have been adopted
in a few areas across the world,3 even in the non-ratifying US or in withdrawing Canada.4
Both systems produce very different outcomes due to the fluctuations economies are
facing. Under a uniform ETS, i.e. an ETS that encompasses all activities, the shocks
have no effect on emissions but induce fluctuations in the price and marginal cost of
abatement, while under a uniform tax, i.e. a tax applying to all activities, they do
not affect the marginal cost of abatement but generate a random volume of emissions.
Restricting to a uniform system, one may prefer one or the other, as shown by Weitzman
(1974). However, mixing the two systems could smooth the fluctuations in ETS prices
and emission volumes, at the cost of departing from the doctrine of a unique carbon
price. Could this be more efficient than a unique carbon price ? The first objective of this
paper is to provide an answer to this question based on a simple normative theoretical
framework.
Observing the various emissions control systems that have emerged across the world, it
is striking that these systems have not been elaborated more cooperatively and that their
mechanisms exhibit many differences.5 Our result that a mixed system might be optimal
worldwide is not incompatible with the emergence of different systems worldwide. Yet,
the multiplicity of so many ETS has also raised the issue of linking various ETS as, from
a standard economic point of view, linking two markets trading the same good is welfare-
improving. Though, there are difficulties and resistance. A difficulty is well known:
A Pareto improvement may call for transfers, which are not easy to implement. Also,
non-economic features, such as the reliability of the trading system and of enforcement
1Before the COP21 conference, a large number of economists have signed a ”call for an ambitious
and credible climate agreement in Paris” in favor of commitments and a unique carbon price. See
https://sites.google.com/a/chaireeconomieduclimat.org/tse-cec-joint-initiative/call . But the agreement
reached in Paris hinges on a ”pledge and review” mechanism in which countries set their own plans for
carbon mitigation without any coordination nor any strong enforcement mechanism.
2See Guesnerie (2010) for a survey.
3Early starters are the Australian NSW (2003) and the EU ETS (2005). The EU ETS has now
integrated Norway domestic emission trading, which started in 2005 too, and the UK ETS that started
as early as 2002. The Swiss ETS ran 2008-2012, the Japan ETS for the Tokyo area started in 2010. The
New Zealand ETS started in 2008.
4The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) started in 2009 and it caps emissions from power
generation in ten north-eastern US states. Emissions trading in California and the Western Climate
Initiative (WCI, a collective ETS agreed between 11 US states and Canadian provinces) are only a couple
of years old.
5For a description of the existing or planned ETS as of 2013 see Talberg - Swoboda (2013).
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mechanisms are put forward by the EU (EU Report, 2008). Finally, difficulties arise
due to the differences in the design of the existing or planned ETS. For example, the
Australian White Paper (2008) was advocating a cap on the price of the permits for
the planned Australian ETS,6 while the EU ETS has no such cap. The total amount of
permits allocated to the firms submitted to an ETS and how this amount should evolve
over time differ across areas. Also ETS may cover different sets of industries: e.g. the
planned coverage of the Australian ETS was larger than the current EU ETS, which does
not include transportation nor forestry. The second set of questions our paper addresses
is therefore related to the uncoordinated design of mixed systems across various areas or
countries around the world.
Our analysis relies on a static model that extends Weitzman (1974) by allowing for
the possibility of the double control mechanism. The mechanism specifies which firms are
submitted to a tax and which ones to an ETS, what we call the scope of the regulation,
as well as the associated tax level and quota allocated to the ETS, what we call the
policy. The mechanism is decided ex ante, before the realization of the shocks that
affect the firms in the economy. This captures the fact that the regulatory framework
cannot be contingent on the realization of shocks that hit constantly the economy. Yet,
the firms’ reaction to shocks should be taken into account when designing a regulatory
framework. We characterize optimal (or equilibrium) policies for any scope and we explain
how the stochastic structure of the shocks influences the optimal design of the scope of
the regulatory framework. In particular, we analyze when it is preferable to adopt a
uniform system, subjecting all firms to either a cap-and-trade mechanism or a tax on
their emissions, or a mixed system in which some firms are regulated through a cap-and-
trade mechanism and the others through a tax.
The basic forces at play are the following. If climate regulation could be made contin-
gent on shocks, i.e. a first best scenario, abatement efforts should be determined so as to
equalize marginal abatement cost across firms with the social marginal benefit of abate-
ment: part of the aggregate shocks should then be absorbed through abatement at the
firms’ level and the coefficient of absorption would be larger, the less steep the aggregate
marginal abatement cost curve, and the steeper the marginal abatement benefit curve.
In a regulatory framework characterized by a ETS sector and a taxed sector, the ETS
sector absorbs all the shocks that impact it, which induces fluctuations in the correspond-
ing marginal cost of abatement, while the taxed sector has a constant marginal cost of
abatement but generates a random volume of emissions that reflects entirely the shocks
that impact it. The optimal tax rate and ETS quota are determined so as to replicate
the first best optimum in expected terms. Expected marginal abatement costs, that is
the tax rate and the expected price on the ETS market, are equalized to their first best
value; and expected net emissions are equalized to their first best optimal value as well.
6This ETS was supposed to start in 2015 but all climate legislation has been repealed in July 2014
due to a political swing.
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So, the precise definition of the scope of the regulatory framework, i.e. of the industries
to be included in the ETS and of those to be taxed, only affects social welfare through
the fluctuations due to the shocks. The optimal scope should then be designed so as
to replicate as closely as possible the emissions fluctuations corresponding to the first
best allocation, given that all fluctuations in emissions are generated by firms subject to
the tax. A uniform ETS system, in which all firms are subject to the ETS regulation,
eradicates all fluctuations while a uniform tax system induces all shocks to be passed on in
emissions fluctuations. Comparing both systems amounts to assessing the relative slopes
of the marginal abatement cost and benefit curves, as in Weitzman (1974). Improving
on either system requires to analyze mixed systems, with a non-degenerate ETS sector
and a non-degenerate taxed sector, and to calibrate the taxed sector so that the shocks
that affect it are sufficiently correlated with the partially dampened aggregate shocks as
required in the first best. But doing so creates a wedge between the marginal abatement
cost of ETS firms and taxed firms: the carbon price is unique but only in expectation,
not for all realized shocks. A mixed system is better than a uniform one when the social
benefits drawn from emission fluctuations closer to the first best compensate for the loss
due to the misallocation of abatement efforts across firms.
We then use this framework to address the issue of the non-cooperative design of
climate regulation systems in various areas worldwide. We consider a world consisting
of several areas, in which each area may use a double control mechanism. The non-
cooperative outcome is compared to the first best emission levels for the global economy
and the corresponding inefficiency that results, i.e. excess in emissions worldwide, is
precisely analyzed. Moreover, we analyze the proposal of linking ETS by considering
a specific form of linking, that we call ETS merging. We extend the strong classical
Pareto argument in favor of merging ETS: such a move benefits both areas, even without
implementing transfers across them or changing the sovereign decisions with respect to the
fiscal instruments, these benefits are reinforced in the uncertain framework we consider,
and we precisely characterize them for each area. Finally, we analyze the situation where
each country chooses a uniform system within its frontiers. First, for the same reasons
that lead a mixed system to be optimal, it might be sub-optimal to have the countries
choosing all a cap-and trade system or all a tax system. For example, it might be optimal
to have that the US, say, impose a cap and trade mechanism and China a tax. We then
analyze the non-cooperative choice of its uniform system by each country and show that
the equilibrium exhibits too many countries under a tax system and too few ones under
an ETS compared to the globally efficient architecture.
Our paper contributes to the long literature, pioneered by Weitzman (1974), on the
use of price or quantity instruments in a framework characterized by uncertainty and
asymmetric information about the shocks between the central authority and the economic
agents. Within a framework of uncertainty on compliance costs, various ways of combining
price and quantity instruments have been shown to provide welfare improvements: a three-
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part tariff (Roberts and Spence 1976), indexed or hybrid instruments allowing a variable
quota (Pizer 2002 and Newell and Pizer 2008), joint use of price and quantity regulation
in the context of multiple pollutants depending on their degree of substitutability or
complementarity (Ambec and Coria 2013). Specifically, our paper is related to Mandell
(2008) who analyzes the possibility of a mixed system in which some firms are subject
to a price mechanism while others are subject to a quantity mechanism. Compared to
our paper, Mandell (2008) focuses on the optimal scope in a more restricted framework
in which there is a single common shock affecting all firms. He shows that a mixed
system might be superior to a single uniform system. The first part of our analysis can
be viewed as providing a generalization of this argument to general stochastic structures.
Independently of our paper, Carlen and Hernandez (2013) consider a general structure
of shocks (with imperfect correlation) but they restrict their analysis to two firms: in
this setting, they obtain a simple version of our result on the minimal degree of positive
correlation that is necessary to obtain an optimal mixed system.7
There is ample evidence that the volatility of the carbon price is large and various
studies have analyzed empirically its determinants. In particular, Chevallier (2011) an-
alyzes both the impact of industrial production and energy prices on the carbon market
and confirms that both have an impact.8 This justifies our modeling choice, namely that
the shocks to the economy play a crucial role in the determination of the optimal scope
as they drive the volatility of both the ETS price and the emission of the firms submitted
to the emissions tax.
The second part of our paper relates to the more recent but very active literature on
the linkage of different climate regulation settings, most notably the linkage of different
ETS.9 Most of this literature assumes away uncertainty and starts with an initial carbon
policies in each country that possibly reflect the country’s objective but are globally
inefficient. ETS merging then can improve global welfare as it induces cost equalization
among participating firms. But differences in objectives also lead countries to incorporate
different cost containment or price control mechanisms in their local ETS and to take into
account offset mechanisms such as CDM differently, which constitutes major obstacles
to the merging of ETS.10 Compared to this literature, we adopt a simplified setting in
7In addition, they investigate the possibility of indexing the tax rate on the realized value of the
ETS price: this possibility of indexing the tax rate on the realization of some uncertainty is potentially
efficiency enhancing.
8More precisely, the author considers a Markov-switching VAR model with two states that is able
to reproduce the boom - bust business cycle. Industrial production is found to impact positively (resp.
negatively) the carbon market during periods of economic expansion (resp. recession), and the energy
prices impact the Markov-switching model.
9This constitutes the common thread of the contributions of the special issue of Climate Policy (Vol-
ume 9, Issue 4, 2009); see also Ranson and Stavins (2012) and Metcalf and Weisbachy (2012).
10Jotzo and Betz (2009) focus on the difficulties raised by some important specifications of the Aus-
tralian project, i.e. a price cap with unlimited access to international CDM. Linking the EU ETS scheme
with such a scheme would have a large impact by effectively introducing a price cap for the global system
and bypassing the European constraint on the use of offset mechanisms. Tuerk et al. (2009) and Sterk
and Kruger (2009) argue similarly that very few direct or bilateral merging of ETS would be viable in
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which we rule out CDM and other offset mechanisms, and we consider that ETS markets
are perfectly competitive with no control mechanisms. We, however, endogenize the
(centralized and decentralized) determination of carbon policies by explicitly formalizing
the role of uncertainty as the fundamental determinant in their design. Wood et al. (2013)
and Heindl - Wood - Jotzo (2014) rely also on a stochastic model to assess various ways
of linking carbon policies between two possibly asymmetric countries. Both papers take
the situation of ETS merging as a benchmark. Wood et al. (2013) compares it with
a situation in which one country is under a tax system and not a ETS and countries
trade allowances, while Heindl - Wood - Jotzo (2014) compares it to the situation in
which one country imposes an additional tax on its constituent firms, on top of the joint
ETS requirement. By contrast, our paper provides an endogenous characterization of the
mixed systems adopted in each country under separate regulation, taking explicitly into
account the impact of shocks on welfare.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a normative analysis of cli-
mate regulation from a worldwide perspective. Section 3 turns to the choices of several
areas with two focuses: the incentives to merge ETS and the non-cooperative choices of
regulatory instruments. Technical results are proved in two appendices, gathering results
corresponding to Sections 2 and 3.
2 A normative analysis of climate policies
We consider a global economy in which the production process generates a stochastic
volume of emissions of a pollutant. Consumers care about the aggregate emissions volume.
Firms may reduce emissions through costly abatement if they have incentives to do so.
We restrict the analysis to two incentive instruments: an emission trading system (ETS)
and a tax. Both instruments can be used simultaneously, with some activities subject to
a tax and the others to an ETS.
The main questions we investigate in this section are: How to determine the firms
covered by an ETS and those subject to a tax ? How to determine the quota of emis-
sions allocated to the ETS firms and the tax rate imposed on non-ETS firms ? Our
answers provide a normative approach to the design of climate policies from a worldwide
perspective.
the short run. They also discuss why an indirect linkage emerges among carbon markets, through the
recognition of CDM and other crediting mechanisms, and how it may help improve global efficiency.
Anger (2008), in a similar vein, shows that significant and beneficial effects can arise from opening the
Kyoto system, so far restricted to governments, to ETS firms, thereby effectively creating a world mar-
ket. Flachsland et al. (2009) points out ETS market failures as well as strategic manipulation of national
carbon policies as additional obstacles to viable merging of ETS.
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2.1 The model
We consider a standard model of a perfectly competitive economy under uncertainty in
which firms emit pollutants that affect consumers. This framework relies on the following
modeling assumptions. First, there is separability in terms of costs and welfare between
the markets for the goods and the emissions volume: abatement decisions have no impact
on the goods’ equilibrium prices and traded quantities. Second, uncertainty is introduced
in the form of shocks on gross (pre-abatement) levels of emissions; shocks on the abatement
technology itself are ruled out. Finally, all cost and surplus functions are quadratic with
respect to emissions volumes. This mild assumption can be viewed as an approximation
of more general functional forms.
Firms. There are n firms in the economy. Each firm i, i ∈ N ≡ {1, 2, ..., n}, emits a
volume of pollutant through its production activities when it does not make any abatement
effort. Let zi + i ≥ 0 denote this volume. zi is assumed to be common knowledge in the
economy; i is known by firm i at the time it decides how much to abate.
Firm i has access to an abatement technology with linear marginal cost:11 abating
ai ≥ 0 costs bi2 a2i and reduces firm i’s emissions down to a volume of net emissions
xi = zi + i − ai. The smaller bi, the more elastic the firm’s abatement decisions to a
variation in the unit price of emissions, so that 1
bi
can be viewed as a measure of firm i’s
flexibility in abating.
At the time of the design of the regulatory instruments, the values of each i are
unknown, perceived as random. The random variable ˜i is referred to as firm i’s shock.
W.l.o.g. we suppose that ˜i has zero mean so that zi is firm i’s average emission volume.
The structure of all shocks (˜i) in the economy plays an important role in the analysis
and we provide below examples of the factors that shape this stochastic structure.
• A change in the emission by-product for a given input use in firm i, e.g. because
of an innovation in its production process or technology, induces a direct change in
the firm’s gross emissions volume and consequently in the marginal abatement cost
to achieve a given level of net emissions.
• A decrease in the prices of carbon-intensive inputs, e.g. a decrease in the oil prices,
leads to an increase in the use of these inputs; this induces an increase in the gross
emissions volumes of all firms using such an input and ultimately to an increase
in the marginal abatement cost of these firms for a given level of net emissions;
moreover these increases are correlated across all firms using this input.
• An increase in the demand for the goods in some industry increases the gross level of
emissions through an increase in production, hence ultimately increases the marginal
11A linear term of the form µiai can be added without change in the analysis, up to a translation in
the expressions for the emission volumes, prices and taxes.
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abatement cost for given net emissions for any firm in this industry; these effects
are strongly correlated across the firms within the industry. For the same reason, a
macroeconomic shock that affects all industries induces correlation across industries.
Firms are submitted to an emission tax or to an ETS, as will be described below. For
the moment, let τ denote the unit cost firm i is facing. Firm i choosing to emit xi obtains
net profits equal to:
Πi = ξi − bi
2
(zi + i − xi)2 − τxi, (1)
in which ξi summarizes the net profits on the goods’ markets, possibly random.
Given a set S of firms, S ⊆ N , we use the following notation:
zS =
∑
i∈S
zi, xS =
∑
i∈S
xi, S =
∑
i∈S
i and
1
bS
=
∑
i∈S
1
bi
with b∅ = 0. (2)
Let us interpret these expressions. zS is the total expected gross emissions volume for a
group S of firms, e.g. a sector or an industry, and S is the total shock in gross emissions of
this group. Thus zS + S corresponds to the gross emissions level of group S. Aggregating
the abatement technologies of all firms in the group S, the abatement cost at the group’s
level is quadratic given by bS
2
a2, since an abatement of a units by the firms in S is efficiently
obtained by assigning shares to the firms in proportion of their flexibility, i.e. by assigning
bS
bi
a to firm i. 1
bS
then measures the flexibility at the group level.
Consumers surplus and social welfare. Consumers’ loss due to emissions only de-
pends on total emissions level xN and is also assumed to be quadratic. In terms of
consumers’ surplus, this gives:
CS = λ− νxN − A
2
x2N (3)
where λ, possibly random, summarizes the surplus on the goods markets. This form for
the consumers’ surplus corresponds to a linearly increasing (social) marginal abatement
benefit, equal to: ν + AxN . A measures the slope of the marginal abatement benefit
curve: it may be perceived as large if e.g. the current volume of emissions is such that
catastrophic climatic consequences would follow a small increase in emissions given the
current situation (threshold effect).
Finally, the revenues R from the emission tax or the sales of permits are collected
by a governmental agency. Assuming no cost of public funds, social welfare is given by
W = CS+R+
∑
i∈N Πi. Transfers within the economy are socially neutral. From (1) and
(3), the expected welfare is (up to an additive term independent of the emission levels):
E
{
−
∑
i∈N
bi
2
(zi + i − xi)2 − νxN − A
2
x2N
}
. (4)
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Optimality is defined with respect to this social welfare criterion.
The designer aims at maximizing this expression, taking into account the reaction
of the firms and their knowledge of the shocks. We focus on situations in which there
are restrictions on the regulatory tools that can be used : some firms are regulated by a
cap-and-trade system and the others by an emissions tax, as we describe now.
Scope and policy. Let N be partitioned in two subsets, T and Q with N = T ∪ Q.
Firms in T are subject to the same tax rate t per unit of net emissions. Firms in Q are
subject to a cap-and-trade mechanism in which a total amount q of emissions is allowed;
firms in Q must remit as many allowances as units of net emissions they produce and
they buy allowances on a (perfectly competitive) resale market that reallocates emission
allowances across firms.12 Each firm is perfectly identified and allocated to one subset or
the other at no cost, and its net emissions can be measured perfectly.13 (T,Q) is called
the scope of the system and, given the scope, the policy consists in (t, q). The system is
said to be uniform when T = N (all firms are submitted to a tax) or Q = N (all firms
are submitted to the ETS).
We use the term ”firm” for simplicity. In practice, the assignment to an ETS is made
at the level of the activity of a plant, so that a company may have only some plants
submitted to an ETS. Furthermore, the assignment is not discretionary in the sense that
all plants performing the same activity should be treated the same way, i.e. all assigned
to the ETS or none. Our analysis is therefore better interpreted as applying to activities
instead of firms; in that interpretation, the abatement cost of i refers to the average cost
of the plants performing activity i.
The scope and the policy are implemented before the shocks are realized. Then, after
the scope and the policy are determined, uncertainty resolves and firms react by choosing
emission levels so as to optimize their net profits and choose their positions on the ETS.
The aim of this section is to investigate the scope and policy that maximize welfare.
The separability assumption. So far, we have assumed a strong separability between
the goods markets and the environmental regulation, namely that gross emission levels
and profits on the goods markets are not affected by the regulation instruments. Even in
the absence of shocks, this assumption is debatable. An interaction surely exists, though
there is no consensus about its magnitude, as testified by the vivid debate on the impact
of the environmental tax policies on growth (see Stern, 2007, Nordhaus, 2007) or, in a
shorter term perspective, on the labor market - the double dividend debate (Bovenberg
12We consider a single tax level and a single trading system. This is not a restrictive assumption as
will be clear later on.
13So, we rule out the possibility that firms decide freely to which mechanism they are subject to, or
that they arbitrage between the two mechanisms. In the EU ETS, firms are subject to the cap-and-trade
mechanism based on observable characteristics and allowances cannot be used by firms outside the cap-
and-trade to reduce their tax basis; they can of course behave as traders on the ETS market but our
perfect competition assumption makes this possibility irrelevant.
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and Goulder, 1996). At a micro level, Martin, de Preux and Wagner (2014) find that a
carbon tax has an impact on energy use, but do not find a significant effect on employment
and production.
Our analysis of the optimal scope can be extended to a more general setting, as will
become clear and made precise in the discussion following Proposition 1. According to
this proposition, the optimal policy for a given scope is determined so that the expected
ETS price is equal to the tax rate, both being equalized to their optimal counterpart
absent uncertainty, which is independent of the scope. Consequently, our results extend
to the situations where the direct effect of the environmental policy on production, prices
and profits on the goods markets, as well as on gross emissions, is captured by mean
values only, not by variations: the firms’ perceived expected costs of emissions drive the
mean value of production decisions. So, the critical assumption in our setting is that of a
separation between the environmental policy and the variations – and not the expected
values – of all production decisions, hence of gross emissions, around their means.14
First best allocation. To understand the various inefficiencies associated with the
scope design, we first consider the first best optimal allocation. The first best optimal
allocation maximizes the social welfare without any constraint assuming the shocks  =
(1, .., n) to be known by the designer; it is obtained by maximizing welfare for each
value of  separately. First best encompasses two conditions. First, cost efficiency, which
requires that the cost of achieving the total emissions volume is minimized, i.e., the
private marginal costs of abatement is equalized across firms ex post. Second, volume
efficiency, which requires that the optimal total emissions volume emerges, i.e., that the
common private marginal cost of abatement is equalized to the social marginal benefit of
abatement. Formally, given , the first best emission volumes xi(), for i ∈ N , satisfy:15
bi (zi + i − xi()) = m() for all i (5)
m() = ν + AxN() (6)
where m() denotes the private marginal costs of abatement at the first best. Explicit
expressions are easily obtained (the computation is detailed in Appendix A). Let x∗i =
xi(0), for i ∈ N and m = m(0) denote the allocation and the marginal abatement cost
obtained at first best when all shocks are equal to their mean (for i = 0 for all i). We
14A more precise statement is relegated in the discussion following Proposition 1.
15We assume that all the zi are large enough compared to
ν
bi
so that the first best allocation as well as
those considered later on produce positive values for the net emissions. This avoids uninteresting corner
solutions.
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obtain:
x∗i = zi −
m
bi
for all i ∈ N with m = bN(ν + AzN)
A+ bN
(7)
xi() = x
∗
i + i −
AbN
bi(A+ bN)
N for all i ∈ N and m() = m+ AbN
A+ bN
N . (8)
Since the allocation is linear in the shocks and the flexibility parameters, we obtain:
xS() = x
∗
S + S −
AbN
bS(A+ bN)
N . (9)
In particular, the first best optimal aggregate volume of emissions is given by: xN() =
x∗N +
bN
A+bN
N . It is random and follows the aggregate shock on total gross emissions N
with a dampening coefficient bN
A+bN
smaller than 1. This coefficient reflects the strength
of decreasing returns in the aggregate abatement technology (the slope of the aggregate
marginal abatement cost curve bN) and the slope of the marginal abatement benefit curve
(A). When bN is small relative to A, variations in the level of net emissions induce small
changes in the aggregate marginal abatement cost but large swings in the social marginal
abatement benefit: therefore, preserving the equality between marginal abatement cost
and benefit in the presence of shocks requires to absorb most of these shocks through
abatement so that net emissions do not fluctuate much. Hence, the dampening coefficient
is small. The stronger decreasing returns in abatement, the steeper marginal abatement
costs and so, the larger the proportion of aggregate shocks on gross emissions that is
passed on into net emissions so that as to maintain efficiency.
As is well known, in a certain world, the first best allocation (x∗i ) can be reached
easily either by imposing a tax on all firms (T = N) or by organizing an ETS (Q = N)
provided that the tax level or the level of quotas are well chosen so as to induce the
optimal common marginal abatement cost m. More generally, the optimal allocation can
be reached through any scope, since the policy can be chosen to induce the marginal cost
m. This neutrality result no longer holds in the presence of uncertainty: the choice of the
scope matters.
2.2 Optimal tax and quota levels given a scope
Given a scope (T,Q), a policy (t, q) determines how the emissions volume of the taxed
sector and the transactions and prices within the ETS vary with the realized shocks. The
optimal policy is chosen under correct anticipation of these reactions.
For a policy (t, q), the amount emitted by a firm is given by bi(zi + i − xi) = τ , with
τ = t in the taxed sector and τ = p in the ETS. Aggregating over firms, the amount
emitted by the taxed sector and the price on the ETS, both random, are given by:
x˜T = zT − t
bT
+ ˜T and p˜ = bQ (zQ + ˜Q − q) . (10)
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The marginal abatement cost is t for the firms in T and p˜ for firms in Q; so, expected
marginal abatement costs are :
t for i ∈ T and bQ(zQ − q) for i ∈ Q. (11)
The first proposition characterizes the optimal policy (t, q) for a given scope.
Proposition 1. Given a scope (T,Q), the optimal policy sets the level of the tax on T
equal to m and the quota on Q equal to x∗Q. For this policy, the expectation of the emissions
volume by firms in T and the expectation of the price level on the ETS are equal to their
first best levels absent uncertainty, respectively x∗T and m.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 shows that the optimal policy is set so as to equalize all firms’ expected
marginal abatement costs to m, the social marginal benefit of abatement at the optimal
level absent uncertainty, and it yields in expected terms the first best optimal emission
levels absent uncertainty. This is obtained by setting the optimal tax equal to m and the
quota on the ETS equal to the aggregate optimal emissions volume of the firms under the
cap-and-trade absent uncertainty. At the optimal policy, the amount emitted by firms in
the taxed sector can be written, using (10):
x˜T = x
∗
T + ˜T (12)
that is, the sum of all shocks on gross emissions in the taxed sector are passed on, without
any dampening, into fluctuations in net emissions. By contrast, all shocks affecting the
gross emissions in the ETS sector are completely wiped out by construction, but the price
on the ETS is random and given by:
p˜ = m+ bQ˜Q. (13)
Let us come back on the possibility of modeling the impact of environmental policy
on the goods markets. Let us first assume that firms subject to the ETS make their
production decisions after observing their idiosyncratic shocks and on the basis of the
expected ETS price, i.e. before they observe the realization of the ETS price; of course,
they make their abatement and purchase of permits decisions after observing the ETS
price. This assumption seems appropriate for all investment decisions and production
plans that need be elaborated in advance and are less flexible than transactions on the
ETS market.
Second, assume the impact of the policy instruments on the variations in gross emis-
sions around their mean are negligible. Specifically, given a tax level or an expected
permit price τ , let zi(τ) be i’s gross emission level under certainty at the equilibrium of
the market, i.e. accounting for the impact of τ on the goods market equilibrium. Shocks
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lead firms to adjust their production level resulting in a gross emission level, say zi(τ, ηi)
if ηi denotes the production shock on firm i. We assume that we can neglect the impact
of τ on the variation of gross emissions around the value without shock, i.e. z(τ, η)−z(τ)
is a random variable independent of τ , which has a null expectation. Thus, z(τ, η) can be
written as z(τ) + .
Third, welfare is quadratic in the choice variables. This assumption was already made
on the emission costs and damage; hence it is extended to the surplus on the goods
markets.
Under these three assumptions,16 given a scope, the optimal policy (tax and quota)
is the one that maximizes the welfare in the absence of shocks, as in Proposition 1.
This implies that the tax is independent of the scope and the quota is set so that the
expected permit price is equal to that optimal tax. The only difference with the previous
analysis here is that this optimal policy accounts for the equilibrium effect on the goods
markets. The analysis of the scope (see the next subsections) then carries through: since,
whatever the scope, the tax and expected emission price are set to the optimal tax without
uncertainty, the gross emission levels are independent of the scope.
2.3 Optimal scope
The first best allocation is characterized by the two conditions of cost efficiency and
volume efficiency, as described by (5)-(6). Under uncertainty, whatever scope (T,Q),
there is little chance that both conditions are met for all realized shocks. Cost efficiency
is not satisfied in a mixed system, as marginal costs are equalized either to the tax or
to the (random) competitive market price on the ETS which typically differs from the
tax (when ˜Q is not equal to 0). Instead a uniform system is cost efficient. However a
uniform system is not volume efficient in general. Recall that the ex post optimal volume
of emissions is x∗N +
bN
A+bN
˜N . With a uniform ETS scope, the quantity is fixed and with
a tax system, the aggregate volume is x∗N + ˜N , which reflects one-for-one the aggregate
shock on gross emissions and is therefore too sensitive to it. A mixed system, on the
other hand, generates an aggregate (random) volume of emissions equal to: x∗N + ˜T ,
which might better replicate the variations of the ex post optimal volume.17
To analyze further the strength of these two effects, we provide a decomposition of
the loss in welfare due to the scope relative to the ex-post optimal allocation. Given a
realization  of the shocks, let W T,Q() denote the welfare associated with a given scope
(T,Q), and its associated optimal policy as given by Proposition 1, and let W fb() denote
the optimal welfare level for the same realization of shocks, which is associated with the
16The key point in the argument is that marginal welfare with respect to a marginal variation in fiscal
instruments is linear in the shocks. Its expectation is independent of the shocks and equal to the level in
the absence of shocks (the certain equivalent).
17For a common shock θ on marginal abatement costs, i.e. if bii = bSS = θ for each i and S, the
optimal quantity is emitted whatever θ if bT = A+ bN . This is the insight of Mandell (2008).
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ex post optimal allocation. As proved in Appendix A, the welfare loss can be written as:
W fb()−W T,Q() = 1
2
(A+ bN)
(
bN
A+ bN
N − T
)2
+
1
2
bN
bQ
bT
2Q. (14)
The first term corresponds to the loss due to a sub-optimal aggregate emissions volume,
as bN
A+bN
N − T corresponds to the difference between the optimal volume and the volume
emitted under the scope (T,Q). The second term corresponds to the loss due to the
inefficient allocation of this total emissions volume across firms due to the differences in
the marginal abatement cost across the taxed and the ETS sectors. The abatement of
firms in T is constant, equal to t
bT
, and that of firms in Q is random, equal to m
bQ
+ Q.
To minimize the cost of abating Q, one should allocate it in proportion of the groups’
flexibility levels, i.e. T should abate bN
bT
Q and Q should only abate
bN
bQ
Q. This explains
why the loss is increasing in the ratio
bQ
bT
and in the magnitude of the shocks.
Taking expectations over the distribution of the shocks, the overall expected loss can
be written as:
W fb −W T,Q = 1
2
(A+ bN)V
[
bN
A+ bN
˜N − ˜T
]
+
1
2
bN
bQ
bT
V[˜Q]. (15)
This expression depends on the parameters determining the reactions of the firms and
the consumers welfare, i.e. the slopes of the marginal abatement cost curves and of
the marginal abatement benefit curve, and the shocks. The term affecting the expected
marginal abatement costs and the expected marginal abatement benefit do not appear
since we consider the optimal policy.
This expression is useful to understand the factors that favor a uniform system and
those that favor a mixed system. Let us first determine the best uniform system. Applying
expression (15) to uniform systems, the loss due to a misallocation of emissions across the
sectors (the second term) is null (since V[Q] = 0 if T = N and 1bT = 0 by convention if Q =
N) and the loss corresponding to the aggregate volume is, up to the factor 1
2(A+bN )
V[˜N ],
equal to A2 for a system with a uniform tax (T = N) and to b2N for a uniform ETS system
(T = ∅). Thus only the value of A relative to bN matters and the best uniform system
is determined, as in the case of a single firm treated in Weitzman (1974): if the slope
of the marginal abatement benefit curve is steeper than that of the aggregate marginal
abatement cost, making a mistake in the level of emissions is socially more costly than
not minimizing the cost of abating, so that a uniform cap-and-trade system dominates,
and conversely.
Now, comparing a mixed system with the best uniform system yields the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. Denote A ≡min{A, bN}. The welfare loss associated with the scope
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(T,Q) relative to the best uniform system is 1
2
L(T,Q) where
L(T,Q) =
{
(A−A)V[˜T ]− 2A cov(˜T , ˜Q) + (bN −A)V[˜Q]
}
+ bN
bQ
bT
V[Q]. (16)
Thus a mixed system (T,Q) is welfare improving if and only if L(T,Q) is negative, or
equivalently, if and only if
bQ
bT
V[˜Q] < 2 cov(˜T , ˜Q) (17)
and
1− 2 cov(˜T , ˜Q)−
bQ
bT
V[˜Q]
2 cov(˜T , ˜Q) + V[˜Q]
<
A
bN
< 1 +
2 cov(˜T , ˜Q)− bQbT V[˜Q]
V[˜T ]
. (18)
The loss is decomposed into the difference in the fluctuations between the best uniform
system and (T,Q) (the term within the large brackets in (16)) and the cost inefficiencies.
Naturally, the optimal mixed system minimizes the loss. The exact determination of the
optimal scope is however difficult, except in specific cases.18
Proposition 2 provides two necessary conditions, (17) and (18) for a mixed system to
be welfare improving over the best uniform system and, together, these conditions are
sufficient. If there exists a scope (T,Q) that satisfies both conditions, then the optimal
scope is mixed, although it might differ from the scope (T,Q) that is tested.
The necessary condition (17) follows from (16) since the terms (A − A)V[˜T ] and
(bN −A)V[˜Q] are non-negative. When A = bN condition (18) is automatically satisfied.
Recall that in that case, a uniform tax system and a uniform cap-and-trade system are
equivalent. So, it is precisely when there is not a big welfare difference between two
uniform systems that they are most likely to be dominated by a mixed system.19 When A
is larger (resp. smaller) than bN , there are forces in favor of a tax system (resp. the ETS),
which explains (18): a mixed scope improves upon a uniform one only if A
bN
belongs to the
interval around 1 defined by (18). Note that there is little evidence on how A and bN differ
worldwide as the aggregate marginal abatement benefits are far from being consensual
even within the scientific community.
As we have seen, the loss due to the cost inefficiency of a mixed system is increasing
in the ratio
bQ
bT
and in the magnitude of the shocks, V[˜Q]. Condition (17) is a necessary
condition for cost inefficiency of a mixed system to be smaller than the gain in volume
efficiency generated by the fact that the mixed system tracks the fluctuations of the first
best allocation better than the best uniform system, i.e., T tracks
bN
bN+A
N . This is possible
18The choice variable, the scope, is a binary partition of N , which makes the optimization problem one
over discrete variables, thereby preventing the use of differential techniques. For example, when all firms
are symmetric, what matters is the number of firms under each regime, and the optimization problem is
one over integers. Another issue is that the objective function might not to be well-behaved, even when
relaxing the integer constraint.
19This does not mean that, in this case, the welfare gain from a mixed system is also small; indeed,
when A = bN the welfare gain from a mixed system is proportional to 2 cov(˜T , ˜Q) − bQbT V[˜Q], which
may be large.
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only if the shocks in the two sectors T and Q are positively correlated. The optimal scope
is thus surely the best uniform system when the shocks affecting the firms are two-by-two
negatively correlated or independent, but this is a rather implausible assumption. When
some correlations are positive, the co-variance of the shocks between the two sectors must
be strong enough.
Condition (17) is rather mild. A simple and plausible situation in which it holds is
as follows: firm i0 is affected by a low variance shock that is highly correlated with the
high-variance shocks affecting (some) other firms in the economy. Then, condition (17)
holds for Q = {i0} provided that firm i0’s flexibility is not too small compared to the
other firms’. This does not necessarily mean that the optimal scope is such that Q is
equal to, or includes, {i0}, but simply that a mixed system is optimal.
There is a fundamental asymmetry between T and Q in the criterion incorporated in
(16), which is due to the external effects imposed by a firm on others in the ETS. Adding
up a firm i in the ETS increases the flexibility of the ETS sector and therefore its ability to
absorb a given shock with less fluctuations in the ETS price. Moreover, if this additional
firm in the ETS suffers no shock, whether it is assigned to the sector under the tax or to
the ETS has no impact on the fluctuations in total emissions and overall, adding up firm
i in the ETS improves cost efficiency without affecting volume efficiency. Formally, this
can be checked by computing the difference in our criterion when firm i, such that ˜i ≡ 0
is shifted from T to Q:
L(T,Q)− L(T − i, Q+ i) = bN( bQ
bN−Q
− bQ+i
bN−Q−i
)V[˜Q].
The difference is positive as bQ > bQ+i and bN−Q < bN−Q−i, hence it is always worth-
shifting i to Q. This argument leads to the following corollary, which contains a policy
recommendation that is not usually invoked in the debate about the optimal scope design.
Corollary 1. If a mixed system is optimal, then the optimal ETS sector should incorporate
all firms that are hit by small shocks.
Proposition 2 can be used to assess the performances of actual climate policies. The
necessary condition for a mixed system to be better than the best uniform system is that
it induces random net emissions (from the taxed sector) that are positively correlated
with the variations of its ETS price. From (12), the fluctuations in the net emissions are
equal to the shocks affecting the gross emissions of the firms that are subject to the tax,
while from (13) the price fluctuations on the ETS market are positively correlated with
the shocks affecting the gross emissions of the ETS firms. Analysts of existing emissions
trading systems often consider that the price fluctuations of allowances are mainly driven
by two factors: macroeconomic shocks and weather shocks. Macroeconomic shocks affect
basically all sectors that emit GHG in a strongly correlated way. So, it is probably a
good signal on the design of the European mixed system that the price of allowances
is highly correlated with macroeconomic conditions, and therefore with shocks affecting
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gross emissions in non-ETS sectors (See Chevalier (2011)). By contrast, climatic shocks
affect mostly the power and heat generation industries, as well as agriculture and farming
in a milder way; they may however have only very limited impact on transportation and
energy intensive industries. This suggests that a mixed system that would impose a cap-
and-trade regulation only on the power and heat generation industries would probably
be suboptimal since the co-variance term in (17) would be rather low, in particular if
agriculture and farming were included in the ETS or if they represented a limited fraction
of the economy. In other terms, in an area where agriculture and farming are important
and are affected by strong weather fluctuations, e.g. perhaps as in Australia or North
America, it may be preferable not to include them in a ETS mostly targeting power plants.
We close this section by illustrating Proposition 2 with two examples that allow us to
provide a tighter characterization of the optimal scope.20
Example with a duplicated economy. Each activity i ∈ I in the economy is du-
plicated into two sub-activities, (i, 1) and (i, 2), with b(i,1) = b(i,2) and ˜(i,1) = ˜(i,2) = ˜i.
Then, the scope (T,Q), with T = {(i, 1), i ∈ I} and Q = {(i, 2), i ∈ I}, satisfies (17).
Corollary 2. Assume the economy is duplicated, as described above. If A and bN are not
too different, a mixed system is optimal.
This example contains an important insight if we consider that the economy consists
in several sectors populated by similar firms, active on the same markets and subject to
the same shocks. Absent any technical or political constraints, it is beneficial in such
a situation to split each sector so that a fraction of firms is under the cap-and-trade
mechanism and the rest is subject to the tax: then, T corresponds to a scaled-down
version of the aggregate shock N , where the scale can be adjusted so as to equal
bN
A+bN
.
Volume efficiency is maximized and dominates cost inefficiency. Such a mixed system
would, however, have to treat similar firms differently, which raises obvious issues about
acceptability.
Symmetric firms. All firms exhibit the same sensitivity to shocks, bi = b for all i, and
the shocks i have identical variance σ
2 and are two-by-two correlated with an identical
correlation coefficient equal to ρ. The symmetry assumption implies bS =
b
|S| . The scope
is summarized by |T |, the number of firms in T . The next corollary states the conditions
under which a mix system is optimal.
Corollary 3. In the symmetric example, if A
b
≥ ρ, a uniform ETS is optimal while if
A
b
≤ ρ
1−2ρ+2ρn , a uniform tax system is optimal. Otherwise,
ρ
1− 2ρ+ 2ρn <
A
b
< ρ,
20In the Appendix, we provide a third example involving a common shock on marginal abatement
costs, as it is related to Mandell (2008).
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and a mixed system is optimal with a taxed sector whose size |T | is an integer such that:
b
2A
− 1
2ρ
≤ |T | ≤ b
2A
− 1
2ρ
+ 1. (19)
In the critical case in which the slope of the marginal abatement benefit curve is equal
to the slope of the aggregate marginal abatement cost curve (A = b
n
), this proposition
shows that the optimal scope necessarily incorporates an ETS (as 1
n
> ρ
1−2ρ+2ρn for any
ρ ∈ (0, 1] and n ≥ 2) and that it is a mixed system if shocks are sufficiently positively
correlated (i.e. if ρ > 1
n
).
Away from the critical case, the same conclusion applies when A > b
n
, except with a
higher threshold for the correlation across shocks (i.e. if ρ > A
b
) and when b
2n−1 < A <
b
n
except with a smaller, but still strictly positive threshold for the correlation across shocks.
When, however, the slope of the marginal abatement benefit curve is very small compared
to the slope of the aggregate marginal abatement cost curve, i.e. when A < b
2n−1 , the
optimal scope is mixed if and only if the correlation coefficient falls within an interior
interval, bounded away from independence and from perfect correlation. So, there is a
rather large domain of parameter values within which a mixed system is optimal in this
setting.
2.4 The consumers and firms’ viewpoint
We consider here the point of view of the different actors in the economy on the design
of the scope. It is immediate that consumers are better off when the scope is an uniform
ETS: the expected volume of emissions is independent of the scope and consumers un-
ambiguously dislike fluctuations in this volume of emissions. The firms’ viewpoint is less
obvious. Here, we ask the following question: given a scope, would a taxed firm rather be
subject to cap-and trade, and conversely ? For that we compare firms’ expected profits
under both systems.
Given the realized i simple computation yields that i’s profit when it faces the cost
τ (dropping the independent term ξi) is: Πi =
τ
2bi
(τ − 2bi(zi + i)). Taking expectations
over the shocks, we obtain the expected profits at the optimal policy. For a firm i subject
to the tax, τ˜ = t = m and its expected profit is:
E
[
Π˜i
]
=
m
2bi
(m− 2bizi). (20)
For a firm i subject to cap-and-trade, the cost of emission is equal to τ˜ = p˜ = m+ bQ˜Q,
which gives the expected profit:
E
[
Π˜i
]
=
m
2bi
(m− 2bizi) + 1
2bi
cov(bQ˜Q, bQ˜Q − 2bi˜i). (21)
The profit for a firm under tax is independent of the scope, as there is no external effect
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across firms and furthermore the tax level stays equal to m whatever the scope. Instead,
the profit for a firm under cap-and-trade depends on the scope as the price depends on
the firms under the ETS.
Consider a firm i under the ETS. We assume that i compares its current profit to the
profit it would achieve under the tax.21 For i in Q, i’s profit is larger under the cap-and-
trade than under the tax if and only if the co-variance term in (21) is positive. The next
proposition shows that firms tend to prefer being subject to a tax than to be included in
the cap-and-trade mechanism.
Proposition 3. If V[˜Q] > 0, then at least one firm in Q would prefer to be subject to
the tax, and this is the case for all firms when (a) the shock is common to all firms’
marginal abatement costs, or (b) firms are symmetric: the shocks have identical variance
and correlation and all flexibility parameters are identical (bi = b for all i).
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.
From a political economy perspective, we can therefore expect that firms will likely
be opposed to the design of a cap-and-trade mechanism and that those subject to it will
actively lobby so that the system be abandoned or they be taken out of it.
Finally the comparison of the firms’ profits in the two sectors holds more generally in
the case of an emissions target. More precisely, given that expected marginal abatement
costs are equalized across the two sectors, i.e. bQ(zQ − q) = t, the firms’ profits are given
by the same type of expressions as in (20) and (21), where the constant term is modified
but still identical across sectors, so that the comparison of the profits only relies on the
variance terms.
3 Climate policies in a world with several areas
A prominent issue in the design of a worldwide regulation of GHG emissions is that
various countries around the world, or more generally various areas, have chosen their
modes of regulation separately. Inefficiencies naturally arise from the non-cooperative
design of climate policies in the absence of uncertainty. One route that has been discussed
is to link the existing ETS of different areas, while preserving sovereignty of each area
(country). We first provide a simple and quantitative assessment of a proposal to merge
the various ETS across areas : such an agreement constitutes a clear improvement over the
non-cooperative benchmark and it is easily implementable as it requires no compensatory
transfers. We then discuss how the decentralized design of scopes matters: it does not
21For a firm under tax, i in T , the reverse criteria says that i compares its current profit to the profit
it would achieve if it joined the ETS, when Q∪{i} is the ETS sector. This means that the firm accounts
for its impact on the price of the ETS. An alternative assumption would be that the firm computes its
profit under the observed price, when Q is the ETS sector. The difference is likely to be negligible for
most firms but not for a large electricity firm like EDF or for an industry.
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impact expected emissions but it affects welfare through the shocks and we analyze the
interaction among areas at this scope design stage.
Consider a world consisting of several areas indexed by α ∈ W ; Nα denotes the set of
firms in area α, N = ∪α∈WNα and N − Nα = ∪β∈W,β 6=αNβ. Consumers are concerned
with the worldwide emissions volume xN . Consumers’ surplus in area α is:
CSα(xN) = λ
α − ναxN − A
α
2
x2N ,
So, consumers’ surplus worldwide is given as before in (3) with ν =
∑
α∈W ν
α, λ =∑
α∈W λ
α and A =
∑
α∈W A
α. Let mα(xN) = ν
α + AαxN denote the local marginal
abatement benefit in area α for a global volume of emissions equal to xN .
As in the previous section, the first best is not implementable because the regulation
is designed before the realization of the shocks. When the scopes in each area are given,
(Tα, Qα) for area α ∈ W , and climate policies are chosen by the world planner, a simple
adaptation of Proposition 1 shows that these policies consist in fixing identical tax rates
equal to the common marginal abatement cost at the worldwide optimum absent uncer-
tainty. Specifically, let x∗i for i ∈ N denote the firms’ optimal volumes of emissions absent
uncertainty and m =
∑
α∈W m
α(x∗N) denote their common marginal abatement cost at
this optimum, which is equal to the worldwide marginal abatement benefit.22 Optimal
policies require for any area α ∈ W : tα = m and quotas equal to the optimal emissions
volumes absent uncertainty qα = x∗Qα . Alternatively, these climate policy choices would
be the ones made under a cooperative scenario across areas, for the given scopes. The
following section instead considers a non-cooperative scenario.
3.1 Decentralized choice of climate policies and merging of ETS
We consider here the merging of ETS, keeping the other parameters of the climate policies
- taxes and scopes - unchanged in each area.
The questions we investigate in the next proposition are: (1) Does the merging of ETS
induce an increase in welfare in each area and can we characterize this welfare increase
(without making specific assumptions on the policies) ? (2) Does the merger induce a
change in the policies, given the existing scopes? In that purpose, we characterize the
policy choices in the Nash equilibrium of the game in which all areas choose independently
and simultaneously their climate policies, given the existing scopes, and we consider the
effects of the merging.
Let us describe more precisely the type of merging and game we consider.
The merging of ETS results in a unique ETS for which the participants are all the
firms initially subject to the ETS of their respective areas and the global quota is equal
to the sum of the quotas in the areas: Q = ∪α∈WQα and q =
∑
α∈W q
α. We also assume
22Note that at the global optimum without uncertainty, the local marginal abatement benefit in area
α is lower than its global value, i.e. mα(x∗N ) < m, because m =
∑
α∈W m
α(x∗N ).
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that the revenues from the sale of the permits are allocated to each area proportionally
to its original quota.
Let us now consider the non-cooperative choice of policies. Suppose that, in each
area α ∈ W , the scopes (Tα, Qα) are given and consider the game in which local policy
designers choose their policies (tα, qα) simultaneously and non-cooperatively, taking into
account expected local welfare. Given scope (Tα, Qα) and policy (tα, qα) in area α ∈ W ,
we let Π˜i denote firm i’s profit and p˜
α the ETS price in area α, so that the expected
welfare in area α, i.e. area α’s objectives in this game, can be written as:
E
[
CSα(x˜N) +
∑
i∈Nα
Π˜i + p˜
αqα + tα
∑
i∈Tα
x˜i
]
.
To study the Nash equilibria, following a similar approach as in Section 2, let us first
consider the game absent uncertainty, i.e. assuming that  ≡ 0. In that game, the scopes
do not matter, and areas choose simultaneously the emissions volumes of their own firms,
i ∈ Nα for α, so as to maximize its local welfare, i.e. the welfare of the entities in the
area. Let xei , for all i ∈ N , denote the volumes of emissions in a Nash equilibrium of this
game. These volumes of emissions (uniquely) solve the following system of equations:
bi(zi + i − xei ) = να + AαxeN = mα(xeN)
for all α and i ∈ Nα. Using these conditions, Appendix B shows that the global volume
of emissions in the Nash equilibrium absent uncertainty satisfies:
xeN = x
∗
N +
∑
(β,γ)∈W2,β 6=γ
[
mβ(x∗N )
bNγ
]
1 +
∑
β∈W
[
Aβ
b
Nβ
] . (22)
So, absent uncertainty, the Nash equilibrium allocation results in an excess in the global
emissions volume compared to the worldwide social optimum, i.e. xeN > x
∗
N , and the
value of the firms’ common marginal abatement costs and of the local marginal abatement
benefits is larger than under the worldwide optimum for each area: mα(xeN) > m
α(x∗N),
for all α ∈ W .23
We are now ready to answer the questions (1) and (2) related to merging and non-
cooperative behaviors.
Proposition 4. 1. Fix the scopes (Tα, Qα) and the policies (tα, qα) in each area α ∈
W. Then, merging the ETS systems (weakly) increases each area α’s local welfare for
any realization of the shocks and yields each area in expectations a gain proportional
to E[(p˜α − p˜)2].
23Though there is an overall excess in emissions at the Nash equilibrium, it might not be the case for
each area. It is possible that one area chooses a more stringent climate policy than what is worldwide
optimal to ’compensate’ for the lax policy of other areas.
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2. Fix the scopes (Tα, Qα) in each area α ∈ W. The climate policies at the non-
cooperative equilibrium are given by:
tα = mα(xeN) and q
α = xeQα (23)
and they lead to the same expected volume of emissions as the Nash equilibrium
absent uncertainty. Moreover if, starting from the equilibrium, ETS are merged, the
same tax rates form an equilibrium in the game where areas can only choose their
tax rates.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Point 1 of the proposition asserts that merging ETS is necessarily beneficial for each
area, even in the absence of compensatory transfers across areas, assuming that the rev-
enues from the sale of the permits are allocated to each area proportionally to its original
quota. The argument is simple. First, under our scenario, the merging of the ETS has
an effect on the firms under ETS and the revenues from the sales of the permits, but not
on the taxed sectors nor the fiscal revenues from the emissions taxes and the consumers’
welfare in each area. This is due to the fact that the volume of emissions of the taxed
firms is identical under separate or merged ETS, which results in identical total volume of
emissions as well. Hence the consumers’ expected surplus in each area are also identical
as they depend only upon the aggregate emissions volume. The comparison between the
two situations (separate ETS or merged ETS) thus boils down to the comparison of the
sum of expected profits of the firms under ETS and the revenues from the sales of the
permits across the two situations.
Second, we show that, for each realized shocks, the sum of the expected profits of the
firms under ETS and the revenues from the sales of the permits in an area increases (resp.
is unchanged) provided the price on the merged ETS differs from the separate ETS price
(resp. is equal). For given shocks , let xαi = zi + i− p
α
bi
and xi = zi + i− pbi denote firm
i’s chosen emissions for a firm in area α, under separate and merged ETS respectively,
and let Παi () = ξi − bi2 (zi + i − xαi )2 − pαxαi and Πi() = ξi − bi2 (zi + i − xi)2 − pxi the
corresponding profits attained in each situation. Since xi maximizes firm i’s profit when
facing price p, the following must be true:
Πi() ≥ ξi − bi
2
(zi + i − xαi )2 − pxαi = Παi () + (pα − p)xαi .
Summing over i ∈ Qα and assuming all permits are sold under the initial situation, i.e.
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assuming that
∑
i∈Qα x
α
i = q
α, it follows:24∑
i∈Qα
Πi() + pq
α ≥
∑
i∈Qα
Παi () + p
αqα,
with a strict inequality if p is different from pα. The left and right hand sides of the in-
equality are respectively the sum of the profits of the firms in Qα plus the revenues from
the sale of the permits for the regulation agency in α under merged ETS and under sepa-
rate ETS respectively: when p < pα the increase in firms’ profits more than compensates
the decrease in the ETS revenues (because of firms’ adjustment) and when p > pα, the
decrease in firms’ profits is more than compensated by the increase in the ETS revenues.
Appendix B further shows that the gains from merging ETS at the level of an area is
proportional to the expectation of the square of the difference in prices effective in this
area between the situation with separate ETS and that with merged ETS, which can be
decomposed into two non-negative terms. The first term is the square of the difference
between expected ETS prices in both situations, (E[p˜α]−E[p˜])2. Unsurprisingly, the larger
the difference in the expected prices between the two situations, the larger the increase
in overall profits due to the equalization of marginal costs on average. The second term
is the variance of the difference between bQα ˜Qα and bQ˜Q, that is: V[bQα ˜Qα − bQ˜Q].
Merging ETS therefore induces no additional welfare gain in the presence of shocks if all
firms in Q are subject to a common shock on their marginal abatement cost. But as soon
as this is not the case, merging ETS induces a strictly positive additional welfare gain,
compared to the case without uncertainty, which is due to a strict improvement in the
absorption of shocks, and this gain increases when the global ETS incorporates firms that
are subject to shocks on their marginal abatement costs that are less correlated with the
shocks affecting firms in the ETS of area α.
Point 2 of Proposition 4 considers the non-cooperative policy choices. According to
(23), the marginal abatement costs in the taxed sector are equalized to the expected
marginal abatement benefit in area α and the expected price in the ETS is equalized to
the tax rate ; so, expected marginal abatement costs are equalized across firms within each
area. From (22), the expected aggregate emissions volume is independent of uncertainty
and of the scopes fixed in each area. As a result, the tax rates are independent of the
scopes, hence the expected marginal abatement costs and the expected emissions volume
within each area as well.
It follows from this discussion that the policy choices produce the same outcome in
expected terms as the ones that would be chosen at the Nash equilibrium in the absence
of uncertainty. Inefficiencies associated to this Nash equilibrium come from two channels:
first, there is no reason for the equalization of the marginal abatement costs or benefits
24One cannot exclude
∑
i∈Qα x
α
i < q
α. In that case, the price equilibrium pα is null so the revenues
before the merger are null; as for the revenues after the ETS are merged, they are also equal to pqα:
either p > 0 and all permits are sold or p = 0. Hence the same inequality holds.
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across areas, as the levels tα are likely to differ across areas; and second, there is an
excess of emissions compared to the worldwide optimum (even if areas are all symmetric).
This excess comes from the fact that each area is concerned with the surplus of its own
consumers only, as reflected by the expression for the tax levels in (23).
The merger considered in Point 1 of Proposition 4 assumes that the tax levels are
fixed and equal across the two scenarios. According to the last statement of Point 2, this
is a valid assumption when the initial tax levels form an equilibrium: Starting from the
Nash equilibrium, merging ETS does not induce areas to change their specific tax rates
thereafter. The argument is as follows. The best response tax level in an area depends
on the taxes chosen by the other areas and the overall emission level. Since the merger
does not affect the emission volumes of the ETS sectors, the best responses are unaffected
by the merging, hence the Nash equilibrium is unchanged as well. Note that once ETS
are merged, cost efficiency does not hold anymore within an area: the local tax rate,
which is initially equal to the expected price within the area, will in general differ from
the expected price on the merged ETS.25
Overall, Proposition 4 suggests that simply merging ETS is an easy way for separate
areas to improve on global efficiency without too much adjustments. Merging ETS benefits
all areas, hence it does not make it necessary to implement compensatory transfers across
areas. Furthermore, it does not lead areas to change their tax rates when they are initially
in equilibrium. Merging ETS is thus a simple and beneficial mechanism, which should be
consensual. Some firms, however, may object to the merging of ETS. As we have seen,
the firms’ profits decrease in an area for the shocks under which the merged ETS price
is higher than the separate ETS price. This occurs in particular when the separate ETS
price is lower than that of all other areas. This is more likely to occur, the lower the
expected price relative to that of others.26 When the policies are equilibrium policies, the
expected prices are equal to the taxes in each area. Thus, the firms in the area in which
the tax level is the lowest may object a merger of ETS.
3.2 Decentralized choice of uniform scopes
In the previous analysis, we have taken the scopes in each area as given. We now consider
the non-cooperative choice of scopes in the specific setting in which each country chooses
a uniform system locally. Before, let us discuss the optimal determination of scopes in an
international system and the related issue of a ’unique carbon price’ in that setting.
Suppose that the US, say, impose a cap and trade mechanism and China a tax. We
might think that this uncoordinated international system is not as efficient as if both
25As an additional comment, note that we do not compare the Nash equilibrium with separate systems
with the equilibrium of a game in which areas choose their policies anticipating that quotas will be
merged; such a situation in analyzed in Helm (2003).
26An increase in the expected price does not necessarily imply a decrease in expected profit, as there
may be an additional benefit to the merger due to a decrease in the price volatility.
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areas had the same system. Drawing on Section 2.3 the analysis suggests, however, that
it may not be worse than a unified system on an efficiency ground.
When the firms within a country are all under the same uniform system, they can be
aggregated into a single one with a flexibility parameter equal to the aggregate one and a
shock equal to the aggregate shock within the countries (thanks to the quadratic setting).
Proposition 2 then applies to the universe in which each i represents a country. When
a mixed system is optimal, having some countries under a tax system and the others
within a ETS is better than a unified system. It is important to stress that this result
holds only under strong conditions on the policies: the policies must be ’globally’ optimal,
meaning that they maximize the expected social welfare worldwide given the scopes, and
this implies a unique carbon price ’in expectation’, equal to the worldwide marginal social
cost. In our setting, this requires an identical tax level across the countries choosing the
tax system and a unique ETS with an adequate quota resulting in an expected price equal
to the common tax. However, this can be obtained only under coordination in the policy
choices, a strong assumption.
We consider instead a non-cooperative setting in which each country chooses a uniform
system and a policy that apply to its residents. The policies are chosen non-cooperatively,
as in point 2 of Proposition 4, and therefore only depend on other countries’ choices
through their (random) global emissions level. The scopes matter only because there are
shocks; their determination does not impact the average emissions volume but it does
impact the random component of the emissions, hence the expected welfare at the local
level of each area.
Let us determine the best uniform system of a country α facing the emissions volume
of the rest of the world, denoted by y + η˜. Country α’s best response depends on the
difference in welfare between a uniform cap-and-trade system and a tax system. This
difference is equal to:
(Aα − bNα)
2
V[˜Nα ] + Aαcov(˜Nα , η˜). (24)
This result can be derived as follows. As shown in Proposition 4, the optimal policies
under a tax or a cap-and-trade systems have the same impact on the expected marginal
abatement costs and emission volumes and react to y similarly. As a result, the welfare
in the two systems differ only through their impact on the variance of the shocks. The
impact due to the variations in the abatement costs are respectively null under a tax
and equal to − bNα
2
V[˜Nα ] under cap-and-trade; those due to the variations in emissions
volume are respectively −Aα
2
V[˜Nα + η˜] and −Aα2 V[η˜]. Collecting terms, we obtain (24)
for the difference in welfare between the cap-and-trade and the tax systems.
Now, consider an equilibrium, in which each country chooses a best response. Let
T represent the set of countries choosing a uniform tax system. From the viewpoint of
country α, we have η˜ =
∑
β∈T ,β 6=α ˜Nβ . Thus, from (24) the uniform cap-and-trade system
is the best choice for α if
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(Aα − bNα)V[˜Nα ] + 2Aαcov(˜Nα ,
∑
β∈T ,β 6=α
˜Nβ) ≥ 0. (25)
The choice between the uniform systems relies on the comparison between the slopes
of the local marginal abatement benefit curve and of the local marginal abatement cost
curves and on the correlation between the variations in ˜Nα and the shocks
∑
β∈T ˜Nβ in
the areas that have chosen the tax system.
We characterize three effects. First, the country does not take into account the ex-
ternalities that the variations of its emissions generate on other countries: the social cost
is measured by Aα and not A. This effect tends to favor the tax system relative to the
global optimum. Second, considerations of cost efficiency across countries do not enter
into a country’s choice, since taxes and ETS are separate per country: the adjustment
parameter is measured by that in country α, bNα , and not by the smaller value bN . This
again tends to favor the tax system relative to the global optimum. Third, a positive
correlation between the shocks increases the benefit of choosing the ETS: it reinforces the
variations in the foreign emissions with the home ones if the tax system is chosen. The
opposite effect occurs when the correlation is negative. In the sequel we assume the more
plausible case of independent or positively correlated shocks. In that case the incentives
for α to choose a uniform cap-and-trade system hence increase with the set T .
From this discussion, it is unclear whether the non-cooperative choice results in too
many or too few countries under a tax regime. It seems however that in general the two
effects favoring the tax system should outweigh the correlation effect.
Indeed, in the independent case, a country α chooses a uniform cap-and-trade at
equilibrium if Aα > bNα and otherwise a tax system. This condition says that each
country makes the same choice as if it were in isolation. But recall that a global cap-
and-trade system is optimal over a global tax system only if A > bN , which is a (much)
weaker condition than Aα > bNα since A > A
α and bN < bNα .
Only a strong enough correlation of the shocks across countries may reverse this effect.
To evaluate further the effects, let us consider the case of n symmetric countries: they
have a common social cost Aα = A
n
, a common marginal abatement cost bNα = b and
they are hit by shocks with identical variance σ2 and with correlation coefficient ρ > 0:
V[˜Nα ] = σ2 for all α, and cov(˜Nα , ˜Nβ) = ρσ2 for all α different from β. In this symmetric
case, the incentives for α to choose a uniform cap-and-trade system simply depend on the
sign of (A
n
− b) + 2Aρnt
n
where nt is the number of countries other than α choosing a
uniform tax system. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Consider the symmetric case where countries choose a uniform system
non-cooperatively. If A
b
≥ n, all countries choose a uniform cap-and-trade at equilibrium
and if A
b
≤ n
1−2ρ+2ρn , a tax system. Otherwise
n
1− 2ρ+ 2ρn <
A
b
< n
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and the equilibrium number of countries choosing a cap-and-trade system is an integer
such that:
n
ρ
b
2A
− 1
2ρ
≤ |T | ≤ n
ρ
b
2A
− 1
2ρ
+ 1. (26)
Let us compare the Nash equilibrium with the optimal centralized choice, as is char-
acterized by Corollary 3. In both situations, the country’s expected marginal cost are
approximately equal. In the centralized choice, optimality requires equality. In the Nash
analysis, we know that the country’s expected marginal cost are independent of its choice
between a tax or a cap-and-trade system. By symmetry, up to integer differences, the ex-
pected marginal cost is thus equalized across all countries. The comparison between (26)
and (19) shows that there are too many countries choosing the tax system in equilibrium
(because n > 1 ≥ ρ).
4 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a normative analysis of the global design of environmental regu-
lation in a world plagued with uncertainty, thereby providing a framework to understand
when a mixed regulation, relying on both a cap-and-trade mechanism and a tax system,
is optimal.
Adopting then a more realistic approach of non-cooperative design of local regulation
by local authorities, the paper has analyzed a cooperative scenario corresponding to the
merging of existing ETS, even with different scopes across areas. Focusing then on an
entirely non-cooperative setting, the paper has characterized the inefficiencies involved and
the impact of scopes, and it has investigated the excessive use of taxation instruments
when local authorities decide non-cooperatively which system to use.
Our analysis relies on some key assumptions that have been discussed and that could be
relaxed. The assumption of a linear-quadratic setting is obviously strong and it facilitates
the characterization of optimal policies and welfare effects. In a general model, the Pareto-
improvement obtained by merging ETS would probably cease to be true and only an
aggregate (worldwide) welfare improvement would remain. The results still suggest that
the issue of compensating transfers may not be critical in a smooth enough world for
which the quadratic approximation is acceptable locally.
The assumption of separability of the environmental regulation and the goods markets
has also been discussed and we have shown how to relax it. Still, some separability is
necessary for our results. Reintroducing a richer interaction between the goods markets
and the environmental regulation would invalidate our separate analysis of policy and
scope and would surely forbid any Pareto argument for merging ETS. But again, if the
interaction is limited, as seems to be the case in the data, the departure from our results
should be limited.
Our results can also easily be amended to a setting in which the designer is subject to
an additional constraint on its expected emissions. Indeed, areas that, as the European
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Union, have signed the Kyoto protocol have to meet an additional emissions target, which
constrains their choice of an optimal scope and associated policies. Viewing such an emis-
sions target as a strictly-enforced cap on (expected) emissions amounts to introducing the
constraint: E[x˜N ] ≤ xmaxN . When xmaxN < x∗N , we can show that this additional constraint
only modifies the deterministic parts of the net emissions and of the policy levels; how-
ever, the effects of the shocks on welfare are unchanged, so that the determination of the
optimal scope is the same as before.27
There is a last dimension that we neglect in our paper, namely, the political economy
considerations behind the design of environmental regulation. We have discussed briefly
how firms may oppose a cap-and-trade system and we also have mentioned the distributive
effects within each area of the merger of ETS. But a more systematic understanding of the
political economy forces at play would certainly enrich our understanding of how climate
regulation is shaped and if and how it can evolve as it is most likely that, in practice, the
design of scopes in various areas is very much a political economy issue in which local
firms and local lobbies influence the determination of the scope.
27From an analytic point of view, adding the constraint to the program modifies the objective by adding
a linear term of the form λ(xmaxN − E[x˜N ]) for an appropriate multiplier λ. The result follows as linear
terms have no impact in our analysis. Formally, this simply modifies the value of m by substituting ν+λ
to ν.
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Appendix A: Global normative analysis
Full information optimum.
To avoid repetition we consider here the general case where there are shocks ˜ within an
area and outside emissions given by y + η˜. In the case of a worldwide planner, all the
shocks are included in  and y = 0.
When the planner has full information on the shocks realized in its area and the outside
shock η˜, he maximizes social welfare by choosing xi(, η), which in our quadratic setting
is fully characterized by the FOC:
for any i ∈ N, bi(zi + i − xi) = ν + A(xN + y + η) ≡ m(, η).
Dividing by bi for each i, summing up over all i ∈ N , and gathering the terms in xN , one
gets:
xN(, η) =
bNzN − (ν + A(y + η))
A+ bN
+
bN
A+ bN
N (27)
m(, η) = bN(zN + N − xN(, η)) = bN(ν + A(y + η + zN))
A+ bN
+
AbN
A+ bN
N (28)
xi(, η) = zi + i − m(, η)
bi
for all i ∈ N (29)
Let y = 0 and η ≡ 0. Absent any uncertainty on , i.e. setting i ≡ 0 for all i, one
obtains the characterization (7) with the value m defined by m = bN (ν+AzN )
A+bN
and then,
for any subset S of N , x∗S = zS − mbS . Under uncertainty on , writing all variables as
deviations from the same variables absent uncertainty, i.e. from the variables with a ∗,
we obtain (8).
When y > 0, the expressions are simply adjusted by constant terms, replacing ν by
ν + Ay in the quantities with a ∗, i.e. without uncertainty.
Proof of Proposition 1.
As above, we include the proof in the case of an outside emission y+η. For any i ∈ T , firm
i maximizes its profit net of the tax (τ = t), i.e. it chooses xi such that bi(zi + i−xi) = t
when the shock is i; then, xT = zT − tbT + T . For any i ∈ Q, firm i maximizes its profit
net of the cost of purchasing the xi permits (τ = p), and the market for permits clears at
a perfectly competitive price p given the realization of uncertainty :
xi = zi + i − p
bi
,∑
i∈Q
xi = q.
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Summing up all xi for i ∈ Q, one gets: p = bQ(zQ − q + Q). Moreover, aggregating over
Q, the following holds: zi + i − xi = bQbi (zQ + Q − q).
Under scope (T,Q) and policy (t, q), the value of social welfare ex post, when the
shocks are  and η, is then given by:
W T,Q(, η, t, q) = λ+
∑
i∈N
ξi − t
2
2bT
− bQ
2
(zQ + Q − q)2
−ν(y + η + zT + T − t
bT
− q)− A
2
(y + η + zT + T − t
bT
− q)2.
The necessary and sufficient FOC for the maximization of the area’s social welfare are
given by:
0 = E
[
∂W T,Q
∂t
(, η, t, q)
]
= − t
bT
+
ν
bT
+
A
bT
(y + zT + q − t
bT
)
0 = E
[
∂W T,Q
∂q
(, η, t, q)
]
= bQ(zQ − q)− ν − A(y + zT + q − t
bT
).
From these, it follows that:
ν + A(y + zT + q − t
bT
) = t = bQ(zQ − q).
So, t = m + AbNy
A+bN
and q = x∗Q − AbNybQ(A+bN ) . It follows that xN = q + zT − tbT + T =
x∗N − AyA+bN + T and p = m +
AbNy
A+bN
+ bQQ. The expressions collapse to the ones in the
text for y = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
The best uniform system has been characterized in the text and it follows that W fb −
W unif = A+bN
2
V[ A
A+bN
N ]. Let us now prove expression (16), calculating the difference be-
tween the expression of W fb−W T,Q, given by (15), and the previously obtained expression
for W fb −W unif :
W unif −W T,Q = 1
2
(A+ bN)
{
V[
bN
A+ bN
N − T ]− V[ A
A+ bN
N ]
}
+
bQbN
2bT
V[Q] (30)
To compute the difference in variances, we decompose N = T + Q and we develop the
terms:
V[
bN
A+ bN
N − T ] − V[ A
A+ bN
N ] =
1
(A+ bN)2
[V[bNQ − AT ]− V[AQ +AT ]]
=
1
(A+ bN)2
{
(A2 −A2)V[T ]− 2(AbN +A2) cov(T , Q) + (b2N −A2)V[Q]
}
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Observe that A2 − A2 is null for A = A and equal to A2 − b2N = (A − bN)(A + bN) for
A = bN , hence A2−A2 = (A−A)(A+bN). Similarly AbN+A2 is either equal to A(bN+A)
for A = bN and to (A + bN)bN for A = A, which implies AbN + A2 = (A + bN)A and
b2N −A2 = (bN −A)(A + bN). Using these in the difference of variances and plugging it
into (30) yields (16).
The rest of the proposition, namely the derivation of (17) and (18) is immediate.
Proof of Corollary 3.
The expected loss of welfare relative to the first best when there are |T | firms in the ETS
can easily be computed:
Ω(|T |) = σ
2
2
[
b2
nA+ b
(1− ρ+ ρn) + A|T |(1− ρ+ ρ|T |)− bρ|T |
]
.
This expression is convex quadratic in |T |. A uniform ETS is optimal if Ω(0) ≤ Ω(1), i.e. if
A−bρ ≥ 0. A uniform tax system is optimal if Ω(n) ≤ Ω(n−1), i.e. if A
b
(1−2ρ+2ρn) ≤ ρ.
Otherwise, the system is mixed and the optimality conditions are given by:
Ω(|T |) ≤ Ω(|T |+ 1)
Ω(|T |) ≤ Ω(|T | − 1).
Simple algebra yields:
A(1− 2ρ+ 2ρ|T |) ≥ bρ ≥ A(1 + 2ρ|T |),
hence the characterization of |T | in the corollary.
Proof of Proposition 3.
A firm strictly prefers the ETS to the tax if and only if cov(bQ˜Q, bQ˜Q − 2bi˜i) > 0.
Assume by contradiction that it is satisfied for each i in Q. Dividing by bi and summing
over i in Q yields:
cov(bQ˜Q,
∑
i∈Q
bQ
bi
˜Q − 2
∑
i∈Q
˜i) > 0⇔ cov(bQ˜Q,−˜Q) > 0,
which is impossible.
Proof of (a). Under a common shock bii = bQQ = θ for all i and the result follows.
Proof of (b). Let shocks have identical variance σ2, a correlation coefficient ρ and
bi = b for all i. Then bQ =
b
nQ
where nQ denotes the number of firms included in the ETS.
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Let i in Q. Up to the factor σ2,
var(˜Q) = nQ[1 + (nQ − 1)ρ] and cov(bQ˜Q, bi˜i) = b
2
nQ
[1 + (nQ − 1)ρ].
This gives:
cov(bQ˜Q, bQ˜Q − 2bi˜i) = − b
2
nQ
[1 + (nQ − 1)ρ].
As var(˜Q) = nQ[1 + (nQ − 1)ρ] can only be non-negative, this proves the result.
Example with a common shock on marginal abatement costs.
Let us consider the polar situation in which the same shock affects all firms’ marginal
abatement cost curves, that is: bi˜i = θ˜ for all i. The following corollary characterizes the
values for which a mixed system is optimal.
Corollary 4. Assume a common shock on marginal abatement costs, bi˜i = θ˜ for all i.
An optimal scope is a mixed system for bN < 2A < 2 maxi∈N bi. Up to indivisibilities,
an optimal scope satisfies28 2A = bT when 2A < maxi∈N bi and is reduced to a single
firm (with maximum bi) in the taxed sector for A < maxi∈N bi < 2A. Otherwise, the
optimal scope is a uniform tax system for bN > 2A and a uniform cap-and-trade scheme
for maxi∈N bi < A.
Proof. When bi˜i = θ˜ for all i, bS ˜S = θ˜ for any subset S ⊂ N . Thus, with σ2 = V[],
(16) can be written as:
L(T,Q) = σ2
{A
b2T
+
1
bQ
−A[ 1
b2N
]
}
= σ2
{ 1
bT
(
A
bT
− 1) + 1
bN
(1− A
bN
)
}
From this expression, an optimal mixed system must minimize 1
bT
( A
bT
− 1), which, up to
indivisibilities, yields bT = 2A and the value σ
2
{
1
4A
+ 1
bN
(1− A
bN
)
}
. This expression must
be negative for the mixed system to dominate the uniform systems. The proposition
follows.
In the critical case, where bN = A, a mixed system is surely optimal (as bN ≤ bi
for each i). It is reasonable to assume that there are firms with very small flexibility
parameters, i.e. large bi, so that maxi∈N bi is very large. Assuming this is the case, a
mixed system is optimal whenever bN < 2A, and otherwise it is a uniform tax system.
In this polar case of a common shock on marginal abatement costs, only the aggregate
flexibility of each sector matters, and there is no general result about the values of bi that
28Any T such that 2A = bT is optimal and, if there is no such T , bT at the optimal scope is either the
greatest value smaller than 2A or the smallest one greater than 2A.
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should be included in the set of firms under the tax or in the ETS, provided the optimal
aggregate flexibility in each sector is reached.
Appendix B: A world with several areas
Worldwide optimum.
Using the decomposition of A and ν, it follows immediately:{
1 + (
∑
α∈W
Aα)
(∑
α∈W
1
bNα
)}
x∗N = zN −
(∑
α∈W
να
)(∑
α∈W
1
bNα
)
.
Proof of Proposition 4.
1. We compare the situation under merged ETS with the situation under separate ETS,
using the notations introduced in the text.
First, note that plugging the value of xαi and xi into the expressions for the profits, we
obtain: Παi () = ξi − (p
α)2
2bi
− pαxαi and Πi() = ξi − (p)
2
2bi
− pxi. Summing up over i ∈ Qα,
adding up the revenues from the sale of permits and noticing that
∑
i∈Qα x
α
i = q
α, it
comes: ∑
i∈Qα
Παi () + p
αqα =
∑
i∈Qα
ξi − (p
α)2
2bQα∑
i∈Qα
Πi() + pq
α =
∑
i∈Qα
ξi − p
2
2bQα
+ p
∑
i∈Qα
(xαi − xi).
Using the fact that xαi − xi = p−p
α
bi
, the difference in social welfare for area α between the
situation with merged ETS and that with separate ETS can be written:
(pα)2 − p2
2bQα
+ p
(p− pα)
bQα
=
(pα − p)2
2bQα
.
This proves Point 1.
2. For given scopes in each area, the general analysis applies at the level of each area
α so as to find out this area’s best response policy, taking the other areas’ random level
of emissions y = xN−Nα as given.
Let µα(y) ≡ bNα (να+Aαy+AαzNα )
Aα+bNα
. Then, the equilibrium tax rate and the optimal
aggregate quota in area α given the aggregate emissions volume xN−Nα in the other areas
are determined by:
tα = µα(E[xN−Nα ]),
qα = zQα − µ
α(E[xN−Nα ])
bQα
.
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From these, it follows that pα = µα(E[xN−Nα ]) + bQαQα is the price on area α’s ETS
market and xTα = zTα − µ
α(E[xN−Nα ])
bTα
+ Tα . Finally, in terms of the area’s aggregate
emissions, as a best response:
E[xNα ] = zNα −
µα(E[xN−Nα ])
bNα
.
Since the best response in terms of E[xNα ] are decreasing with slope of absolute value
less than one, a sufficient condition for an interior equilibrium is: for all α
zNα − µ
α(0)
bNα
≤ bN−αzN−α − ν
−α
A−α
.
It is then immediate to check that in equilibrium µα(E[xN−Nα ]) = να + AαE[xN ] =
mα(E[xN ]) = bi(zi − E[xi]) for any i ∈ Nα, so that E[xi] = xei : expected emissions
volumes are equal to their value in the equilibrium absent uncertainty. Moreover, the
usual manipulation yields:{
1 +
(∑
α∈W
Aα
bNα
)}
E[xN ] = zN −
(∑
α∈W
να
bNα
)
.
The comparison with the similar expression for x∗N is then immediate. Moreover, in
equilibrium,
tα = να+AαE[xN ] = να+Aαx∗N +Aα(E[x]−x∗N) ≡ mα(x∗N)+Aα(E[xN ]−x∗N) > mα(x∗N)
qα = zQα − t
α
bQα
= zQα − m
bQα
+
m− tα
bQα
= x∗Qα +
m− tα
bQα
so that: qα > x∗Qα ⇔ m > tα.
Finally, starting from the equilibrium of the complete game of policy choices, let
us fix the quotas in all areas at their equilbrium values and consider a reduced game
in which areas can only choose their respective tax rates. In this reduced game with
separate ETS, it is immediate that the best response tax rate in area α is still given by:
tα = µα(E[xN−Nα ]). As this expression only depends upon the tax rates in other areas
(through xTβ = zTβ − tβb
Tβ
+ Tβ for all β 6= α) and the sum of the quotas in the other
areas, the same expression also determines the best response tax rate in area α under
merged ETS with the sum of quotas. Hence, the same tax rates constitute an equilibrium
in the reduced game, whether ETS are separate or merged.
Proof of Proposition 5
α chooses a uniform cap-and-trade system (resp. a tax system) if (A
n
− b) + 2A
n
ρnt > 0
where nt is the number of countries choosing a uniform tax system other than α. Thus, at
equilibrium all countries choose a uniform cap-and-trade if A
n
> b (recall ρ is assumed non-
36
negative). They all choose a uniform tax if (A
n
− b) + 2A
n
ρ(n− 1) < 0. When neither case
occurs, we have an equilibrium in which some countries choose the tax, which requires
(A
n
− b) + 2A
n
ρ(|T | − 1) ≥ 0 and other choose a cap-and-trade system, which requires
(A
n
− b) + 2A
n
ρ|T | ≥ 0 where T is the set choosing the tax. These two conditions yield the
characterization of T in the proposition.
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